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INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of Janice Fine’s path-breaking book, Worker Centers: 
Communities a t the Edge o f  the Dream  in 2006, scholars and commentators 
on the left and the right of the political spectrum have grappled with how 
to characterize these emergent worker organizations on the US labor rela­
tions scene. This chapter deepens our understanding of the nature of worker 
centers by examining the funding trends that underlay the wide range of 
experimental organizing and advocacy strategies highlighted in other chap­
ters of this volume. Undoubtedly, to emerge and survive, these organiza­
tions need money (Bobo and Pabellon 2016). But how financially stable 
are worker centers? How big are they? Where does the funding come from? 
How do they compare to labor unions? To address some of these questions, 
we compiled a large collection of available data to complete the first sys­
tematic empirical analysis of worker center funding across multiple years 
(2008 through 2014).
Our analysis includes the amounts and sources of revenue for more than 
100 worker centers over a seven-year period (2008 through 2014). We drew 
from three main sources of available information to construct funding 
profiles for each worker center in our sample. First, we incorporated the 
nonprofit organizations’ required annual filings to the US Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS)— a filing required of any organization that has nonprofit
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tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the US Internal Revenue 
Code. Most worker centers have nonprofit status, which enables them to 
access foundation, individual donor, and government funding to support 
their initiatives to improve the living and working conditions of low-wage 
workers (Fine 2011). Second, we used labor organizations’ required annual 
filings to the US Department of Labor. Third, we gathered data from the 
Foundation Directory Online’s compilation of foundation donations.
O ur “size up” of worker center income from 2008 through 2014 
complicates the dominant portrayal of worker centers as small and unstable. 
M ost worker centers are indeed organizations w ith  little  revenue. 
Nevertheless, there is a wide range of revenue size among worker centers. 
There are even a few “giants,” with revenue so high that they were statistical 
outliers. Worker center budgets are somewhat unstable: the past growth 
of a worker center’s revenue typically has no bearing on its future growth. 
There also seemed to be no advantage for large-revenue organizations. 
Worker centers with large budgets were typically just as unstable as centers 
operating on a shoestring budget and were more susceptible to shrinking 
in times of economic downturn.
Our inquiry into the streams of funding that worker centers receive tells 
a “no one size fits a ll” story of diversity. Unlike labor unions, whose revenue 
relies almost exclusively on dues from members, worker centers craft diverse 
funding portfolios and get almost no funding from membership dues. 
Much like those of other nonprofit organizations, worker centers’ revenue 
streams are diverse. The most common funding streams of worker centers 
are monies from providing program services, charitable foundation grants, 
and government funding. In terms of reliance, worker centers overwhelmingly 
depend on funding streams that are external to the organization (foundation 
grants, government grants, and individual donations) rather than funding 
streams that are internally generated, such as membership dues. Despite 
increased strategic collaborations between some labor unions and worker 
centers reported elsewhere in this volume, we find that funding from labor 
unions serves as a minuscule portion of worker center revenue overall.
OUR SAMPLE OF WORKER CENTERS
We derive the population of worker centers in our sample from Fine and 
Theodore’s infographic of worker centers from 2012 (Fine and Theodore 
2013). We sought to collect data on each of these worker centers from the 
forms they are required to submit annually to the IRS, specifically the IRS 
990 form (hereafter referred to as IRS 990). We did this for each worker 
center in every year from 2008 through 2014. Thus, the IRS 990 is both 
the primary source of data and the primary delimiter of our sample. Hie 
IRS 990 offers a trove of data. It includes an organization’s address, the
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names of officers/leaders, and other demographic information, as well as 
a breakdown of revenue and expenses. W hile there are limitations to the 
IRS 990 (Gronbjerg 2002), it is used widely as an adequate source of data 
on nonprofit revenue and sources of income (Froelich, Knoepfle, and Poliak 
2000; Powell and Steinberg 2006).
Table 1 illustrates that for 2012, we obtained IRS 990s for 60% (104) 
of the 172 worker centers on the 2012 list.1 Our analysis of those worker 
centers for which we could not obtain IRS 990s, and therefore could not 
include in our sample, leads us to conclude that our sample likely over­
represents larger and more stable worker centers. First, a substantial portion 
of worker centers, 15% of the total in 2012, were not stand-alone 
organizations. Instead, they were “parented” by another larger organization.2 
Because they are a program or part of a larger nonprofit that deals with 
issues beyond workplace justice, we could not isolate the size and funding 
sources of the worker centers within the parents’ overall budgets.
Second, we confirmed that another roughly 5% of all worker centers 
were not required to file an IRS 990 because their revenue was so small. 
Organizations with 501(c)(3) status who have revenue of $50,000 or below 
are not required to report financial information to the IRS.3 Third, we 
know that relying on IRS 990s as a source of data “carries an important 
undercount bias” more generally (Culleton Colwell 1997; Gleeson and 
Bloemraad 2012; Gronbjerg 1993). Gleeson and Bloemraad (2012) have 
shown that some groups may not have enough resources to even register 
for 501(c)(3) nonprofit status in the first place, while others may simply 
not file the 990 even though they are obligated to do so. Thus, relying on
TABLE 1
Percentage o f Worker Centers by Rationale for Availability o f Data
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1% in sample (with IRS
|990 data)
62 61 59 60 60 59 62
% not in sample 
(known rationale) 22 23 23 23 23 23 23
i%  parented ‘ 13 15 : 15 . 15 15 )  15 . 15 '
% too small 6 5 5 5 5 5 5
1% religious or other 3 3 3 3 3 3 3iexempt
% don’t know why not 16 16 17 17 16 17 15in sample
^oealVo 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total number of 
_ worker centers 152
162 166 169 172 172 172
42 NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL
IRS 990s carries a bias toward under-representing resource-poor 
organizations.
Finally, because our data collection strategy focused on a list of worker 
centers created in 2012, our sample of worker centers in earlier years (2008 
through 2011) likely missed some worker centers that existed in these years 
but did not survive until 2012. For those years, our sample over-represents 
organizations with stable-enough funding sources to survive until 2012. 
For 2013 and 2014, we collected data on worker centers that existed in 
2012. Therefore, our sample does not include organizations that emerged 
in those two later years. To minimize these effects, we report analyses based 
on the 2012 data, even though parallel analyses of other years confirm the 
trends reported for 2012.
FINDINGS ON THE SIZE AND STABILITY OF WORKER 
CENTER REVENUE
Some scholars and commentators suggest that worker centers are powerful 
players on the labor relations scene (M anheim 2013; US Chamber of 
Commerce 2014; Wong 2015). Cordero-Guzman, Izvanariu, and Narro 
(2013) highlight some centers have formed sector-based networks that serve 
as labor market intermediaries. Others question whether most worker cen­
ters are even large enough to have a demonstrable impact beyond the in­
dividual level (Compa 2015; Eidelson 2013; Fine 2006; Rosenfeld 2006).
Flere we consider just how big and stable worker center revenue is. Our 
data does not allow us to look at all aspects of worker center size, which 
would entail a more holistic consideration of factors such as membership 
size, numbers of individuals served, and other measures of organizational 
impact. Nevertheless, revenue size can undoubtedly help us understand 
the scope of a worker center s reach. The literature on nonprofit organizations, 
for instance, suggests that larger revenue can lead to increased political 
visibility, which increases the likelihood of evoking positive responses from 
policy makers (de Graauw 2016).
Revenue Size?
Figure l ’s histogram shows that worker center revenue tend to be low. This 
is true even though our sample of worker centers is likely to over-represent 
larger worker centers. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the modal worker center 
(the one with the greatest frequency) has a revenue of between $100,000 
and $200,000. O f the worker centers in this modal range, more than half 
of them (12 of the 22) had revenue below $150,000. The concentration of 
worker centers in this lower revenue range is further affirmed when we 
consider that a quarter of all worker centers in our sample had yearly rev­
enue of less than $179,163. Furthermore, the median revenue level for our
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FIGURE 1
Distribution ofW orker Centers byTotal Revenue, 2 0 12
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Source: IRS 990s.
sample was only $410,010. These observations about the revenue streams 
ofworker centers are consistent with Fine’s 2005 study, which showed that 
more than half of worker centers were small organizations with annual 
revenue of $250,000 or less (Fine 2006). Low revenue is a trait worker 
centers share with other nonprofits, which have been characterized as “small 
and cash-poor” (Gronbjerg 1993: 53).
A  brief comparison w ith  revenue among more traditional labor 
organizations further highlights the relatively small revenue levels of the 
worker centers in our sample. In 2012, for instance, UNITE HERE’s 
Chicago Local 1 had a revenue of $9 million, and UNITE HERE’s San 
Francisco Local 2 reported a revenue of $6.4 million. A smaller UNITE 
HERE local in Washington, D.C., Local 25, reported approximately $4 
million in revenue for 2012 (DOL LM-2 filings for Local 1, Local 2, and 
Local 25; US DOL 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). If we look beyond local unions 
to international unions such as the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU), the small revenue sizes of worker centers are put into even more 
stark relief. In 2012, SEIU’s reported revenue was $307 million (US DOL 
2012d). In contrast, the combined total revenue of all 104 worker centers 
in our 2012 sample was equal to just under $78 million.
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And yet Figure 1 also reveals how widely worker center revenue ranges.
A quarter of worker centers in our sample (26) had revenue greater than 
$779,036. In this largest quartile, six worker centers had revenue of less 
than $1 million per year, 12 had revenue between $1 and $2 million per 
year, and eight had revenue larger than $2 million.4 These eight worker 
centers had impressive revenue levels: two of them had revenue of just over 
$3 million, one had revenue just over $7 million, and one’s revenue exceeded 
$8 million. It is these eight high-revenue cases that pull up the average 
revenue of worker centers in our sample to $747,431, way above the median 
or mode. The identification of eight outliers is consistent with Fine’s analysis, 
elsewhere in this volume, that some worker centers have grown into giants 
that still have some work that fits the definition of a “worker center” but 
also do organizing and advocacy work that goes well beyond service 
provision, organizing, and advocacy at the local level.
Revenue Stability?
Worker centers’ funding strategies are often characterized as unstable and 
unsustainable (Compa 2015; Fine 2011; Fisk 2016). Indeed, worker centers 
are often described as surviving on “shoestring” budgets (Estlund 2015; i 
Greenhouse 2014; Griffith 2015), with highly unstable levels of funding ! 
year to year (Cordero-Guzman 2015). Our multi-year panel data offers a 
rare opportunity to assess the stability of individual worker center revenue 
over time, albeit with data that over-represents those worker centers stable 
enough to have existed before and after 2012. We assess the stability of 
revenue by measuring each worker center’s annual rate of change in total 
revenue, as other studies of nonprofits have done (Granbjerg 1993). Worker 
centers with stable revenue would be those with zero to positive rates of 
growth from one year to the next. Furthermore, we can assess the relative 
stability in worker center funding by examining how well a worker center’s 
annual revenue growth in one year predicts that of subsequent years. Table 
2 presents a series of multivariate analyses that assess whether the prior 
year’s rate of growth, adjusted for inflation, predicts the subsequent year’s 
rate of growth, controlling for the worker center’s total revenue.
The results presented in Table 2 affirm the idea that worker center 
revenue is unstable. In three of the five years (from 2012 through 2014, 
represented in columns 3, 4, and 5), the annual rates of growth do not 
predict the subsequent year’s rates of growth. It would seem that worker 
centers rarely repeat fund-raising success from one year to the next. 
Additionally, the results for 2010 and 2011 suggest that even when there 
is a significant relationship between a worker center’s rate of growth in a 
prior year and that of the following year, the effect is not in the direction 
of stability. For example, column 1 portrays that for every 1% increase in
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TABLE 2
The Effects o f Worker Center Prior Growth on Subsequent Years Growth 
(Adjusted for Inflation), 2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 4
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
k . 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
in Real in Real in Real in Real in Real
Variables Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
12009 real rate
lof growth;;;;'
2009 revenue 
(adjusted to 2008)
12010 real rare 
I of growth
2010 revenue 
(adjusted to 2008)
■2011 real rate Tv*''
| ol growth ■
2011 revenue 
(adjusted to 2008)
1 2012 real rate : 
[of growth
2012 revenue 
(adjusted to 2008)
l2013rS^rate 
[of growth
2013 revenue 
(adjusted to 2008)
-0.248* 
(0.139) : ;«■ K.r . .
-4.38e-06
(4.33e-06)
-0.166** "?
(0.0812) T
-3.50e-06
(4.68e-06)
*  '0.0935 
T (0.0856) S
-6.48e-06*
(3.52e-06)
-0.0622  
T  (0.116) ;; ;
-3.93e-06
(4.44e-06)
0.0943 
f», (0.0756)
1.32e-06
(3.02e-06)
15.09** ; 12.53* - 15.32*** ’ tt 14.88** ; : 7.170
(7.477) (6.426) •••. (5.188) (6.141) . . (4.475)..
91 94 94 97 99
0.053 0.051 0.044 0.012 0.019
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1
worker center revenue from 2008 to 2009, there was a 0.25% decrease in 
Worker center growth from 2009 to 2010, regardless of a worker center’s 
size; that is, it is precisely those that experienced revenue growth in a prior 
year that tended to experience less growth in subsequent years. It would 
seem that no good deed— in this case, that of successful fund-raising— 
goes unpunished at worker centers.
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Hie results for 2010 and 2011 also raise questions about how worker center 
stability may relate to political or economic shocks, such as the economic 
recession. An economic crisis unfolded over the course of 18 months that 
stretched from December 2007 through June 2009 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research 2010). We know that the crisis affected both government 
and charitable foundations’ ability to support nonprofit agencies like worker 
centers. Thus, we might anticipate an across-the-board loss of revenue for 
worker centers. W hat these results suggest, however, is that this effect was not 
equally felt. In fact, the recession exacted its toll on precisely those worker 
centers that had been flourishing at the time the recession hit. The results also 
raise the question of sustainability of grants. It may be that these organizations 
benefited from nonrenewable government or foundation grants, or that they 
were affected by other shocks, such as a loss of political will.
Relationship Between Revenue Size and Stability?
We find little support for the idea that worker centers with smaller revenue 
were more vulnerable to shrinking than larger-revenue worker centers. 
Figure 2 characterizes the relationship between a group’s size of revenue 
(in 2012) and its revenue stability in the two successive years (2013 and
FIGURE 2
Average Annual Growth Rate (2 0 12 -2 0 14 )  by Total Revenue
Note: Annual growth rate is calculated after adjusting total revenue for inflation.
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TABLE 3
Percentage o f Revenue Identified by Type o f Source
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Overall
Average
Identified sources 53 58 58 65 57 62 66 59
IRS 37 44 41 43 35 41 43 40
Non-IRS 16 14 17 23 22 21 22 19
Unidentified sources 48 42 42 34 43 38 35 41
Total percentage ■ 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number of worker centers 94 99 98 102 104 101 105
remaining 40% of worker center income by stream. Nevertheless, we know 
this funding comes from sources external to the organizations because it 
constitutes the income the worker centers placed in the catch-all “all other 
contributions” portion of the IRS 990.
Table 3 shows that we were able to identify the sources of about 40% 
of worker centers’ overall revenue using the IRS 990s. These forms allowed 
us to report the specific funding streams of income from program services, 
membership dues, and government grants with considerable confidence. 
Nonetheless, the IRS 990 did not indicate how much of “all other 
contributions” came from two sources that some have alleged are significant: 
labor unions and charitable foundations. We were able to account for nearly 
another 20% of a worker center’s average funding streams by examining 
two non-IRS sources.
We sought to uncover union funding to worker centers from the US 
Department of Labor’s Office of Labor Management and Standards (DOL 
OLMS). Unions must file yearly spending reports with the DOL OLMS 
that include the receiving organization’s name, the date of payment, and 
the purpose of payment.7 Unfortunately, there were no unique identifiers 
for each worker center in the DOL OLMS data. This made the data 
vulnerable to entries that were spelled differently or incorrectly, and as such 
may undercount levels of union funding. Nevertheless, we are confident 
that our efforts yielded a robust list of union contributions to worker centers.
To identify funding to worker centers from charitable foundations, we 
consulted the Foundation Directory Online, which is self-described as a 
research tool for nonprofits to find funders. A significant limitation of this 
source is the coverage of the Foundation Directory itself. It is likely to have
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missing data because it may pull from different sources year to year. Indeed, 
its website states that it is “not designed for statistical or aggregate research.”8 
Moreover, the Foundation Directory reports grants in the year they are 
allocated, regardless of whether the grant was actually dispersed over multiple 
years. Thus, our data collection method is vulnerable to undercounting as 
well as overcounting foundation funding in a particular year.
Given the work of Fine (2006) and Frantz and Fernandes (2016) and 
the limitations of the non-IRS data sources on union and foundation 
revenue streams, we generally consider our estimates on these two streams 
to be minimum amounts. It is likely that a portion of the roughly 40% of 
worker center “all other contributions” revenue that remains unidentified 
may in fact come from foundations and unions, but a substantial portion 
of it certainly comes from individual donors as well. Thus, the following 
analysis focuses m ainly on what we can  say about the varied streams of 
funding using the strengths of our data set.
FINDINGS ON WORKER CENTER FUNDING STREAMS
As scholars of nonprofit funding have noted (Granbjerg 1993), it is useful 
to look at the whole group of worker centers because macrolevel patterns 
affect the field the individual organizations operate within, and they can 
influence how groups compete and collaborate with one another. Figure 
3 gives us a bird’s-eye view of the relative size of various funding streams
FIGURE 3
W orker Center Funding Streams, 2 0 12
r„^e' P^let internal sources include fund-raising events, investments, and federated 
cltnPatgns.
lirces: Calculated based on IRS 990s, Foundation Directory Online, and US DOL.
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in the total pie of income that worker centers collect. It reveals that worker 
centers rely on a diverse set of funding streams. As we might expect for 
any nonprofit, we found that worker centers rely to a significant degree on 
external, as opposed to internal, sources of funding. Internal revenue 
streams include membership dues, as well as less significant sources such 
as fund-raising events and investments. All told, the external sources add 
up to more than 80% of the overall pool of worker center funding for 
2012. This percentage is even higher given that some “program services” 
income comes from government contracts rather than fees from partici­
pants. The relative insignificance of internal sources of funding underscores 
the degree to which worker centers look beyond their immediate commu­
nity to make ends meet. This reliance on external funding sources brings 
to mind important questions about the extent to which reliance on exter­
nal funders affects worker centers’ programmatic priorities, questions we 
take up below in our Directions for Future Research section.
Our analysis also suggested trends about the relative importance of 
various funding streams to worker center income. Here we drew on 
Granbjerg’s definition of importance (1993) as an assessment of both how 
commonly a particular source is used (funding stream prevalence) and 
how dependent an organization was on a particular source (funding stream 
dependence).
Member Dues
Our research confirms the predominant wisdom that worker centers find 
it challenging to receive member dues from their low-wage constituencies 
(Fine 2006; Gordon 2005). As Figure 3 illustrates, worker centers as a 
whole obtained merely 1.8% of their total revenue from membership dues 
in 2012. The dearth of resources obtained from membership dues is even 
more apparent if  we consider the relative prevalence of dues— how this 
total pot of membership dues is distributed across worker centers. As the 
“Dues” column of Table 4 shows, the vast majority (68%) of worker cen­
ters did not receive any funds from dues. Furthermore, worker centers that 
did obtain money from dues were not dependent on them. O f the 34 
worker centers that reported receiving any money from dues, the vast ma­
jority obtained less than 5% of their revenue from membership dues. Only 
seven worker centers obtained more than 5% of their revenue from dues.
Furthermore, higher-revenue worker centers were not more likely than 
their smaller counterparts to raise money from dues.9 Figure 4 gives us a 
visual snapshot of how dependence on dues relates to revenue size. It 
confirms that the percentage of revenue that worker centers received from 
dues was consistently low across each of these sizes.10 The first bar of Figure 
4 represents the smallest quartile of worker centers.11 The last two groups,
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TABLE 4
Frequency Distribution o f  the Revenue Percent by Funding Stream, 2 0 12
Range Foundation Program Government Dues Union
0.1-0.99 3 13 0 15 2
40 -49 8 4 1 1 0
100 100 100 100 100
FIGURE 4
Mean Percentage o f  Revenue by Source and Size
70
<$175,000 $175-399,999 $400,000-774,999 $775,000-1.9M >$2M
■ Dues ■Program BUnion ■  Government ■  Foundation
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represented in the last two bars, split the largest quartile of worker centers 
between outliers (those that report revenue in excess of $2 million) and 
those that fall within the normal distribution.12
Program Services
Overall, worker centers benefited much more from income for program 
services than from the receipt of membership dues. As Figure 3 represents, 
program services accounted for 12.4% of the total pie of funding received 
by worker centers in 2012. This finding is not that surprising given that 
worker centers’ nonprofit status is reliant to some extent on their provision 
of services (although this does not require them to charge fees). Tlic IRS 
990 defines “program services” as monies received for activities that ac­
complish the organization’s “exempt purposes” of providing relief to the 
“poor,” “distressed,” and “underprivileged.”
Program service income was a prevalent source of funding among worker 
centers. Table 4 shows just 41% of worker centers reported no revenue from 
program services in 2012. This makes income from program services the 
second most common stream of revenue for worker centers, second only 
to foundations. Nonetheless, worker centers’ relative dependence on program 
services varies widely. Table 4 illustrates that nearly 30% of worker centers 
received less than 5% of their revenue from program services (13% receiving 
less than 1%, and 15% receiving between 1% and 4.9% of their revenue). 
However, on average, worker centers received 11% of their revenue from 
program services, with six worker centers receiving more than half of their 
funding from program services. There were even two groups that received 
99% of their overall funding from program services they provide, such as 
legal services and trainings.
We might expect that larger worker centers would receive a greater 
portion of their revenue from program services because they have more 
organizational capacity to provide larger-scale services. Some authors suggest 
that direct services can be more difficult for small worker centers (Milkman, 
Bloom, and Narro 2010: 11). However, it does not seem that size was a 
predictor of reliance on program services for our sample.13 Figure 4’s stacked 
bar chart illustrates that program services were an important source of 
funding across all size groupings. The top quarter (excluding the biggest 
eight) did receive the highest average percentage from program services 
(15.6%), and the percentage of revenue received from program services 
descends in each of the next smaller subgroupings. Nevertheless, the smallest 
quarter and the largest eight worker centers received a sim ilar average 
amount from program services (about 7%). The evidence points to an 
across-the-board, albeit widely ranging, reliance on program services.14
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g o vern m en t  g r a n ts
Unlike labor unions, which are not eligible for many government grants 
because they are not 501(c)(3) organizations, worker centers receive gov­
ernment grants to engage in a wide range of activities. These activities in­
clude tax preparation assistance, citizenship education and training, home­
lessness alleviation efforts, worker rights education, and efforts to combat 
labor trafficking.15 Similar to funding streams of other nonprofits (Gronbjerg 
1993), government grants are a relatively common funding stream for 
worker centers. As Figure 3 represents, we could confirm that more than 
16% of worker center revenue in 2012 came from government grants. This 
is largely consistent with Fine’s study (2006), which found that 21% of 
worker center income came from government sources.
Owing to limitations in the IRS data, the actual percentage of revenue 
from government grants in our sample is also likely to be higher. The 
monies worker centers report under the “government contributions” portion 
of the IRS 990 cannot include those government grants designated for 
program services that primarily benefit a governmental unit, as opposed 
to the public as a whole. Worker centers must report such government 
grants under “program services” rather than “government contributions.” 
This limitation notwithstanding, 44%  of the 80 worker centers that had 
to report whether they received government contributions obtained some 
type of government grant.16
The “Government” column of Table 4 illustrates how difficult it is to 
characterize the typical degree to which worker centers depend on govern­
ment grants. The average percentage of revenue that worker centers ob­
tained from government contributions was 13.2%, but the percentage for 
any given worker center ranged from 2% to 89%. Worker centers that did 
receive government contributions, though, tended to be more dependent 
on them than they were on dues or program services. Only 6% of these 
worker centers obtained less than 5% of their revenue from government 
contributions. Meanwhile, 12% of the 80 reporting worker centers (nine 
worker centers) received more than half of their funding from government 
contributions.17
Worker center dependence on this funding stream varies widely regardless 
of size. Even though they may have more institutional resources, higher- 
revenue worker centers were not more likely than smaller groups to receive 
government grants. Figure 4 gives us a visual representation of how the 
Percentage of revenue worker centers obtained from government grants 
yaried across differently sized worker centers.18 The three bars representing 
the three largest groupings obtained a roughly similar percentage of their 
revenue from government, ranging from 14% for the middle group and
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peaking in the next highest group at 18%.19 Those worker centers with 
revenue from $175,000 to $400,000 tended to receive just under 8% of 
their revenue from government grants, a difference that was, nonetheless, j 
not significant from the overall average of 15.6% for the remaining groups.20 
Indeed, it is a relatively small worker center in this group, with revenue of « 
just under $250,000, that received the highest proportion of its revenue j 
from government grants. Thus, while government grants are an important 
source of funding for worker centers, the prevalence and the relative ' 
dependence of worker centers on such government grants varies tremendously.
Foundations
Our limited evidence on foundation funding confirms what others have 
claimed: worker centers would not be able to exist, let alone flourish, were 
it not for grants from charitable foundations (Fine 2006; Greenhouse 2014). 
As Figure 3 indicates, foundation grants listed in the Foundation Directory : 
equaled roughly a fifth (21%) of the pooled revenue for all worker centers 
in 2012. The true percentage is likely to be much higher given Fine’s find- . 
ing (2006) that 61% of worker center funding came from charitable foun- ■ 
dations.
Furthermore, as the first column of Table 4 shows, foundation grants , 
were the most prevalent stream of funding for worker centers. A minority j 
of worker centers (just 38%) received no funding from foundations. Given 
that we suspect there were foundation grants that we could not track, we 
believe that deriving funding from foundations is even more common than 
we can show here. We would not want to read too much into the figures 
we have on the relative dependence of worker centers on foundation fund­
ing because we know foundations may report a multi-year grant in a single 
year and that the fiscal years of foundations may differ from those of worker ■ 
centers. Nevertheless, a glance down the last column of Table 4 suggests 
that the degree to which worker centers rely on foundation grants varies 
just as much as their reliance on government grants.21
Unions
Several chapters in this volume illustrate ways that worker centers and labor 
unions have partnered in recent years to advance such things as minimum- 
wage legislation, paid sick leave, and campaigns against large retailers. The 
US Chamber of Commerce and other worker center critics have alleged 
that some worker centers rely so heavily on union funding that they are 
essentially “union fronts” (Manheim 2013).22 Nonetheless, our research 
suggests that worker centers are generally not financially dependent on 
labor unions.
Our research shows that the vast majority of worker centers do not 
receive significant funding from labor unions. Figure 3, based on DOL
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just under $250,000, that received the highest proportion of its revenue 
from government grants. Thus, while government grants are an important 
source of funding for worker centers, the prevalence and the relative 
dependence of worker centers on such government grants varies tremendously.
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claimed: worker centers would not be able to exist, let alone flourish, were 
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As Figure 3 indicates, foundation grants listed in the Foundation Directory 
equaled roughly a fifth (21%) of the pooled revenue for all worker centers 
in 2012. The true percentage is likely to be much higher given Fine’s find­
ing (2006) that 61% of worker center funding came from charitable foun­
dations.
Furthermore, as the first column of Table 4 shows, foundation grants 
were the most prevalent stream of funding for worker centers. A minority 
of worker centers (just 38%) received no funding from foundations. Given 
that we suspect there were foundation grants that we could not track, we 
believe that deriving funding from foundations is even more common than 
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ing because we know foundations may report a multi-year grant in a single 
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just as much as their reliance on government grants.21
Unions
Several chapters in this volume illustrate ways that worker centers and labor 
unions have partnered in recent years to advance such things as minimum- 
wage legislation, paid sick leave, and campaigns against large retailers. The 
US Chamber of Commerce and other worker center critics have alleged 
that some worker centers rely so heavily on union funding that they are 
essentially “union fronts” (Manheim 2013).22 Nonetheless, our research 
suggests that worker centers are generally not financially dependent on 
labor unions.
Our research shows that the vast majority of worker centers do not 
receive significant funding from labor unions. Figure 3, based on DOL
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membership base. Similarly, Granbjerg (1993: 53) contends that nonprof- : 
it reliance on external funders sets up “demanding exchange relationships 
that restrict organizational choice.” These concerns notwithstanding, it is 
possible that some external grants foster the creation of new program ser­
vices, which in turn can become somewhat self-sustaining internal sourc- . 
es of funding after the external grant runs out.
Second, future research could consider how external funders may 
influence organizational priorities more directly (Estey 2006; Fisk 2016). | 
Granbjerg’s study of nonprofits (1993: 53) characterizes many nonprofits | 
as having “limited ability to resist efforts by funders to exert influence” 
because of low revenue. Others note that some external entities are not 
interested in nonprofits’ efforts to achieve deeper, systemwide change 
through organizing and agitation (Eidelson 2013). In a similar vein, Franz 
and Fernandes (2016) argue that some foundations place restraints on 
larger national worker centers that alter their ability to challenge neoliberal , 
rationalities. They contend that, instead, these grants encourage worker 
centers to promote program services that foster employer alliances, workforce 
skills training, and business ventures. In this way, these authors portray 
some program services as moving organizations away from the more 
controversial organizing efforts designed to challenge policies and structures 
that hurt low-wage workers (Eidelson 2013; Franz and Fernandes 2016). :
However, disagreement between nonprofit scholars on the question of 
how government funding affects political advocacy (de Graauw 2016) >; 
highlights the need for future research into the extent to which external ; 
funders inhibit worker centers from economic agitation and policy advocacy.
In contrast to critics of external funding sources, some nonprofit scholars i 
see reliance on government funding as boosting many organizations’ ability 
to engage in political advocacy effectively. For these authors, because 
government-dependent nonprofits need to advocate for continued j 
government support of their efforts, they constantly build organizational 
resources around political advocacy that they can capitalize on (Chaves, 
Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004).
In light of the ongoing debates about worker centers’ ability to foster 
structural changes in the low-wage labor market, and the role of bottom- 
up worker voices in these organizations, future research should continue : 
to unpack the relationship between reliance on external funding and worker 
centers’ financial sustainability and programmatic choices.
More Research on the Nature of Government Grants
Given our finding that government grants provide an important source of 
funding for many (although certainly not all) worker centers, future re­
search should endeavor to unpack what kinds of activities federal, state, 
and local government entities fund. Further research, for example, could
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identify the types of state and local government funding worker centers 
receive because these state and local sources provide the majority of gov­
ernment funding (Umel 2006). Moreover, prior research shows that local 
government officials play a key and varied role in filtering money to non­
profits (de Graauw, Gleeson, and Bloemraad 2013).25
New research could also examine how government funding interacts 
with the social-change strategies of worker centers. Scholars, for instance, 
could continue to tease out how government grants relate to public-private 
efforts to improve the enforcement of labor standards in low-wage labor 
markets. The executive agencies in charge of enforcing these laws, including 
the US DOL, cannot ensure full enforcement of the laws on the books 
(Bernhardt et al. 2009; Weil 2016).26 Moreover, they often do not have 
access to the communities that are most at risk of suffering violations (Fine 
2017; Gleeson 2009). There is a growing body of literature that considers 
the role of community groups in labor and employment law “co-enforcement” 
(Amengual and Fine 2016; Demers and Sylvester 2016; Elmore 2018; Fine 
2017; Fine and Gordon 2010; Gleeson 2009; Lesniewski and Canon 2016). 
Luce’s work, for instance, describes the ways that community organizations 
improved the implementation of city-level living-wage ordinances (2004). 
In this way, worker centers help keep government agencies accountable to 
the process of “making rights real” by facilitating their implementation 
(de Graauw 2016). Co-enforcement, of course, does not require a resource 
transfer between the government and a nonprofit, but, undoubtedly, funding 
helps facilitate these collaborations.
Scholars have identified worker center—facilitated connections between 
government enforcers and workers in such contexts as health and safety 
initiatives (Fine 2015) and the National Labor Relations Board (Lesniewski 
and Canon 2016). W hile we do not know the exact purpose of the majority 
of government funding, our data confirms that some worker centers obtained 
federal money to improve the enforcement of worker rights during the 
period of our study (2008 through 2014). Of the three federal grants that 
would enable worker centers to assist in the enforcement of worker rights 
(and which we could confirm on USAspending.gov), the largest was the 
Susan Harwood Training Grant from the US DOL’s Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration. Susan Harwood grants are intended to provide 
training and education for employers and workers in an effort to reduce 
health and safety hazards in the workplace.27 Other workers’ rights 
enforcement grants from federal sources include the Environmental Justice 
Small Grant28 and the Services for Trafficking Victims Program Grant.29 
Future research should comprehensively document, as some have already 
started to do (Amengual and Fine 2016), the nature and effects of these 
public-private efforts to patrol the low-wage labor market.30
58 NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL
More Research on the Nature of Program Services
Our research revealed that revenue from program services is the most 
common funding stream for worker centers, but it did little to elaborate 
on the nature of the services offered to low-wage workers who participate 
in worker centers. W hat kinds of services are provided and which are the 
most common? Future research could deepen our understanding of the 
variety and nature of program services provided. Here, we propose one 
area of future inquiry, but there are many more.
Because member dues in the traditional labor union context are seen as 
a way to connect workers to the organization’s decision m aking and 
accountability structure, one question our findings raise is the extent to 
which program services may be an alternative way to give workers a voice 
in their organizations. Do the worker centers’ program service offerings 
result from participant requests? Do they encourage ongoing participation, 
or membership, in the day-to-day activities of the organization? More 
specifically, to what extent do program services hold the organization 
accountable to the community it serves? A cursory review of select worker 
center websites suggests that the sorts of program services range from legal 
help to trainings and professional development—from education about 
individual rights to community organizing. It is certainly feasible to imagine 
that some of these classes could result in strong, membership-like connections 
between workers and worker centers. Moreover, some income from program 
services comes directly from fees, which are internally generated sources 
of funding that could help to insulate the organization from the interference 
and influence of external funding sources.
Relatedly, some recent scholarship contends that worker centers should 
tie member dues to the program services provided. Fisk’s recent work on 
worker centers (2016) is one example. She argues that worker centers should 
move toward a dues model, at least in part to increase the organization’s 
accountability to its members rather than to external funders such as 
charitable foundations and government agencies. In developing her argument 
for the increased use of member dues by worker centers, she proposes that 
worker centers tie the amount of dues to the approximate value of program 
services the worker center is providing to the participant.
Future research, perhaps through the development of in-depth case 
studies, could consider the ways that worker centers' program services may, 
in fact, already enhance a worker center’s accountability to the communities 
it serves, or act as a means of encouraging membership.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we “sized” up worker center income and found that, liter­
ally, no one size fits all worker centers. W hile most worker centers did
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indeed have little revenue, worker centers ranged widely in their revenue 
sizes. Indeed, our sample included a handful of giant worker centers that 
towered over the pack. Unfortunately, instability in their revenue size is a 
characteristic that fits all worker centers, big and small. Worker centers 
with bigger revenue seemed just as unstable as their poorer counterparts. 
They were also more susceptible to shrinking in times of economic down­
turn.
W ith revenue streams, we again found that worker centers cannot be 
characterized by one story or funding profile. Rather, our picture of diverse 
funding streams aligns with others who have characterized worker centers 
as exhibiting organizational “hybridity” (Cordero-Guzman et al. 2013; 
Fine 2006). We find worker centers’ funding strategies to be as diverse as 
their organizing strategies discussed elsewhere in this volume. Unlike 
traditional labor unions, worker centers do not typically use or rely very 
much on membership dues. Rather, our research confirms that the lion’s 
share of worker center revenue comes from external sources, especially 
from government and foundation grants. These findings raise important 
questions about the relationship between funding strategies and 
programmatic choices at worker centers. Learning more about funding 
and its effects can tell us about the nature of these emergent organizations 
on the labor relations scene. Future research should continue to examine 
the evolving nature of these diverse organizations that seek justice and 
dignity for workers in the low-wage labor market.
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ENDNOTES
1 Our sample o f  worker centers includes every worker center from the Fine/Theodore 
2 0 12  list for which we could obtain an IRS 990 for at least one year between 2008 and 2014. 
The IRS 990 categorized revenue streams dilferendy before 2008, so we were not able to 
collect data for 2007  or earlier. Our data set ends in 2 0 14  because it is the most recent year 
for which reliable data was available.
2 Examples o f  nonprofits that parented worker centers include Catholic Charities, the 
Empire Justice Center, Community Partners, the Human Sendees Council, and the Amer­
ican Friends Service Committee.
3A  worker center with less than $50,000 annual revenue, for instance, needs to file only 
an “ePostcard.”
4 These eight cases are defined as outliers by die Tukey method o f using the interquar­
tile range to determine mild oudiers. They are all above the cutoff for mild oudiers— equal 
to die upper 75 percentile + 1.5 x the interquartile range o f  1,678,846. Furthermore, four 
o f these cases would constitute what Tukey called “severe oudiers”— those that are larger than 
the upper 75 percentile + 3 x the interquartile range o f  $2,578,655.
5 W e confirm this finding widi a series o f  bivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regres­
sion analyses. In all but one o f  the five years (2011), a worker centers size could not predict 
the subsequent year’s growth. ■
6 I f we remove the five largest worker centers (those with revenue larger than $3 million) 
from the 2 0 12  analysis in column 3, the relationship is no longer significant. It is these larg­
est organizations, all but one o f  which shrank or experienced slower growth in 2012 , that 
appear to be driving the effects.
7 These reports are publicly available either via the DOL OLMS website s “Payer/Payee” 
search portal or via a direct download o f all union spending records for a given year. The 
D O L OLMS data was only available through downloading the entire yearly database. This 
made it extremely onerous to sift through manually, so we ran a search query using Microsoft 
Access.
8 Foundation Center, no date. Foundation Directoiy Online (http://bit.ly/2twfyjM).
5 There is no significant correlation between revenue in 20 12  and the percentage o f 
revenue derived from dues.
10 There was no statistical difference in the mean percentage o f  revenue from dues be­
tween any single size subgroup o f  worker centers compared with the overall mean o f  the 
remainder o f  worker centers.
11 The size groupings are roughly equivalent to the 2 0 12  quartiles as represented in 
Figure 1 and the inner Tukey fence for identifying outliers.
12 W hile the percentages are small, two o f  die outlier organizations, with revenue above 
$2 million per year, collect a half million dollars in member dues each year.
I3There is no significant correlation between revenue in 2 0 12  and the percentage o f 
revenue a worker center received from program services.
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\iirjr  14 We tested for whether the mean proportion o f revenue received from program ser­
vices in each o f the subgroups differed significantly from the mean percentage o f revenue 
coming from program services for the remainder o f worker centers. None o f these t-tests for 
significant difference in means were significant.
15To take a very preliminary look at the nature o f the federal government grants worker 
centers receive, we used the USAspending.gov database. Mandated by the Federal Funding 
Accountability and Transparency Act o f 2006, USAspending.gov is a searchable website “to 
give the American public access to information on how their tax dollars are spent” (http:// 
bit.ly/2rdZiUs). We identified nine types o f federal-level government grants to worker cen­
ters for service and education initiatives to address the myriad needs o f low-income com­
munities. These were the Susan Harwood Training Grant; Environmental Justice Small Grant, 
Culturally and Linguistically Specific Services Program Grant; Services for Trafficking Victims 
Program Grant; Fund for the Improvement o f  Education Grant; Low Income Taxpayer 
Clinics Project Grant; Citizenship Education and Training Project Grant; Supportive Hous­
ing Project Grant; and Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) M atching Grant. 
USAspending.gov is, however, a limited data source and does not have any information on 
state and local government grants.
16 Out o f  our total 104  worker centers for which we could obtain the IRS 990s in 2 012 , 
only 80 met the revenue threshold that required they report how much they received from 
government grants. Organizations with revenue above $50,000, but below $200,000, are 
required to file only an IRS EZ form, which does not separate the government contribuuons. 
Some cridque the IRS 990s as having potential inputting errors related to government grants 
(Froelich, Knoepfle, and Poliak 2000).
17 These worker centers constitute oudiers falling above the inner Tukey fence (here = 
44%) for determining oudiers from what should be the normal distribution.
18 The first bar reports no government grants because this grouping includes all those 
too small to have to report government sources to the IRS.
19 There was no significant difference in the mean o f each o f these three subgroups 
compared with the mean o f  the remaining worker centers.
20The t-test for significant difference revealed that the mean o f 7.8%  for this subgroup 
was significandy lower (t = 1.4185 , with a p value > 0.10) than the mean received by all other 
larger revenue worker centers. There was also no significant correlation between total revenue 
in 20 12  and a worker centers relative dependence on government grants. The Pearsons cor­
relation coefficient is 0 .1160 , which, with 80 observations, does not meet the threshold o f 
significance. This makes sense intuitively when we consider that some o f the largest worker 
centers, those with revenue over $2 million, did not necessarily receive the highest proportion 
o f their revenue from government grants. The largest, for instance, received just over a 
quarter o f their resources from government grants. There were even some in this group that 
received no government grants.
21 Similarly, we do not feel confident about coming to any conclusions on whether a 
worker centers size has much to do with its ability to secure foundation grants. Our research 
does reveal that the largest eight worker centers obtained a significandy higher percentage o f 
their revenue from foundations (32% ), and the smallest worker centers relied much less on 
foundations (7%). However, the group with the second highest average percentage o f rev­
enue that came from foundations, at 23% , was the group o f small-to-medium-sized worker
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centers (with revenue from $175 ,000  to $400,000). Furthermore, the correlation between 
revenue in 2 0 12  and the percentage o f a centers revenue reported from foundations was also 
not significant.
22 Similarly, Worker Center Watch “aims to expose the direct operational linkages and 
funding between unions and worker centers by highlighting their tactics” (http://bit. 
ly/2tBGT4n).
23 Most o f these received around 30%  from unions, but there was one small worker 
center (with a revenue that ranged from roughly $70,000 to $150 ,0 00  during the period) 
that received 65%  o f  its revenue from unions in a single year.
24 There is no significant correlation between the 2 0 12  revenue and the percentage of 
revenue obtained from unions.
25 These are sometimes Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), which are 
federally funded but locally decided (de Graauw, Gleeson, and Bloemraad 2013). de Graauw, 
Gleeson, and Bloemraad also show that location, and local officials, matter. Their research 
compares how local officials managed CDBG grant allocations in three different cities. They 
expose how immigrant organizations are incorporated differendy depending on whether they 
are in a traditional immigrant gateway, a 21st-century gateway, or a new suburban destina­
tion.
“ There are, for example, only about 1,000 US DOL investigators to enforce federal 
wage and hour law in the more than seven million establishments covered by such laws across 
the country (Weil 2016).
27 Susan Harwood Training Grants are OSTIA grants “to provide training and education 
programs for employers and workers on the recognition, avoidance, and prevention o f safety 
and health hazards in their workplaces and to inform workers o f their rights and employers 
o f their responsibilities” (http://bit.ly/2rga9NF). For 2012 , the Susan Harwood grant ac­
counted for 10  out o f  18 grants, which constitute more than half o f the total federal govern­
ment grant money that we were able to confirm on USAspending.gov.
28 The Environmental Justice Small Grant program (http://bit.ly/2rfL8lw) “supports 
and empowers communities working on solutions to local environmental and public health 
issues. The program is designed to help communities understand and address exposure to 
multiple environmental harms and risks.”
29 Services for Trafficking Victims Program Grant: State and Local Law Enforcement 
Assistance (http://bit.ly/2yzeb9X): “The primary goal o f this solicitation is to provide timely, 
high-quality services to victims o f human trafficking. ... Funding also will support efforts 
to increase the capacity o f communities to respond to victims through the development of 
interagency partnerships and professional training, public outreach, and awareness campaigns.”
30 W hile funding for worker centers to enforce worker rights is not without contro­
versy, Gleeson (2009) shows that nonprofits play key roles in helping individuals learn about 
and mobilize their rights in the workplace. They can provide education in vulnerable com­
munities and provide accessible space, which builds a relationship o f trust with labor standards 
enforcement officials (Fine 2017 ; Gleeson 2009; Gordon 2005; Weil and Pyles 2005). They 
can also play a key information-gathering role that can help government agency personnel 
make decisions about their outreach efforts and enforcement targets (Bernhardt et al. 2009; 
Delp and Riley 2 0 15 ; Fine and Gordon 2010).
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